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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs.
In the course of the trial there were offered in evidence narcotics
and weighing equipment which had been seized in the course of
a search without a warrant. The defendant contended, unsuccess-
fully, that the search having been illegal, the evidence should
have been suppressed. A uniform line of jurisprudence dating
back to 1920 holds that such evidence, although illegally obtained,
may nevertheless be admitted in evidence. The federal rule has
always been to the contrary.36 And the result remains unchanged
despite the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Wolf v. Colorado,37 holding that the Fourth Amendment
is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In a characteristically eloquent dissent-
ing opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Murphy underscored the
necessity, as he saw it, for extending the federal rule to state
police officials who all too frequently show a callous disregard
for the right of privacy intended to be secured by the Fourth
Amendment.38
The Mastricovo case was the first to be decided since the
decision in Wolf v. Colorado, and it was at least to be hoped that
the court might reappraise the Louisiana rule in the light of what
was said there. However, the case was not cited, and the principle
involved in the Wolf case is dismissed with the mere citation of
prior Louisiana jurisprudence.
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
The past term, like the one which preceded it, produced one
case in the field of labor law. Jones v. Hansen' was a suit by
three union members against seven of their brothers who had
served as a trial committee to hear and decide charges against
the plaintiffs, resulting in expulsion of one and suspension of the
other two from the union. Plaintiffs asked for wages lost and
for damages attributable to the defendants' advising employers
that plaintiffs were no longer members of the union in good stand-
36. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Reynard, Free-
dom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional
Right?, 25 Ind. L.J. 259 (1950).
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
38. See Reynard, supra note 36, at 306.
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1. 220 La. 673, 57 So. 2d 224 (1952).
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ing, which conduct had resulted in plaintiffs' inability to secure
employment. Predicating their attack upon alleged defects in the
manner in which the union trial commitee had proceeded with
the hearing of the charges, plaintiffs contended, in substance,
that they had been denied due process of law, and thus deprived
of a fundamental right, the liberty to pursue a livelihood.
Justice LeBlanc, writing the unanimous opinion of the court,
reviewed the proceedings and observed that "In some cases the
date of the trial was fixed as near as two days from the date of
notice and it would appear that this was a short notice for a per-
son to defend himself on twelve charges such as were presented
against those plaintiffs. '2 He also noted that the union's consti-
tution required that "reasonable notice" be accorded in disciplin-
ary proceedings. Conceding that the plaintiffs had not been
accorded sufficient notice to comply with judicial concepts of due
process, the court concluded that this omission had been cured
by the action of the union's national executive committee when
it considered the plaintiffs' appeals and directed that "each. mem-
ber be again informed to appear before a committee to review
the case and be tried again."'8 No rehearing was in fact accorded
the plaintiffs, the local union construing the action of the national
as permitting a review of the cases by the trial committee in the
absence of the plaintiffs or witnesses-a construction which was
apparently justified, as the national committee on a second appeal
approved the decision of the trial committee.
Based on these procedural facts the court concluded:
"While it may be that the evidence produced, or the
manner in which the trials were conducted, would not have
been sufficient in a court of law, yet there was evidence to
support the finding of the trial committee and under our
jurisprudence courts will not interfere with the internal
affairs of an unincorporated association so as to settle dis-
putes between the members, or questions of policy, discipline
or internal government where the by-laws or constitution of
the organization is followed, where there is no fraud, oppres-
sion or bad faith; or no property or civil rights are involved.
. . .No invasion of plaintiffs' property or civil rights were
involved because they merely enjoyed the privilege of mem-
bership, with only a right to the joint use and enjoyment of
2. 220 La. 673, 682, 57 So. 2d 224, 228 (1952).
3. 220 La. 673, 684, 57 So. 2d 224, 228 (1952).
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the association's property and funds so long as they remained
members. Their rights ceased upon their suspension in the
same way they would have if they had terminated their
membership by their own voluntary acts. See Elfer v. Marine
Engineers Beneficial Ass'n. No. 12 (179 La. 383, 154 So. 32
[1934]) ."4
Thus, Louisiana continues to adhere to the so-called "contract
theory" of union membership, regarding membership in a union
as a contract, the terms of which consist of the union's constitu-
tion and by-laws. This is a view adopted by the courts of a num-
ber of jurisdictions. In another group of states a so-called "prop-
erty right" theory of union membership has evolved, which the
courts there will invoke for purposes of interfering with internal
union affairs where property rights are found to be involved. It is
true, of course, that the Louisiana court has said that it will inter-
pose judicial relief where property rights are involved, but to
date, no such rights have been discovered in the cases. In the
jurisdictions adhering to the property right theory, however, the
courts have readily seized upon the right to pursue a trade as a
property right and would unquestionably have regarded Jones v.
Hansen in that light.5
As a practical matter, neither of the two theories, borrowed
as they are from pre-existing legal concepts in an attempt to
accommodate the rising labor movement to our jurisprudence, is
designed to cope with the problems of internal union affairs.
These are matters which, if not properly administered by the
unions themselves, will ultimately come to be controlled by legis-
lation. As a matter of fact, provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act
already confer a remedy for workers in the predicament of the
plaintiffs in this case,6 and had the controversy arisen subsequent
to the effective date of that legislation (the disciplinary proceed-
ings were held in 1946), they would presumably have been con-
trolled by it, and conceivably the courts might be held to lack
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.7
4. 220 La. 673, 685 and 687, 57 So. 2d 224, 229 (1952).
5. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1951).
6. Section 8(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discharge or refuse to hire a person because of nonmembership in a union
unless his nonmembership is attributable to nonpayment of dues or fees;
and Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause an
employer to violate Section 8(a)(3). Either or both of them may be required
to restore lost wages to an employee who is the victim of such discrimination.
7. See Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 489 (1952).
